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Key Points
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Unfamiliar
Terms
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The vocabulary of Enlightenment Rationalism,
although it was essential to the beginnings of liberal democracy, has become
an impediment to the preservation of the progress of democratic societies.
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For in its ideal form, the culture of
liberalism would be one which was enlightened, secular; in which no trace of
divinity remained, either in the form of a divinized world or a divinized
self. Such a culture would have no
room for the notion that there are nonhuman forces to which human beings
should be responsible.
●
According to Davidson, the irrationality in us
actually drives us to be rational. Our
desire to be rational may cause us to try to change our desires, although
there might be no rational cause for it, thereby rendering us irrational.
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In arguments, there are hardly ever any true
standoffs, for there are an infinite number of ways to approach any argument,
and who’s to say that there one approach is more effective than another?
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The forces unleashed by the Enlightenment -
the ways of science, reasoning, and thinking - have undermined the
Enlightenment’s own convictions.
●
Moral principles only have a point insofar as
they incorporate tacit references to a variety of institutions, practices,
and vocabularies of moral and political deliberations.
●
Wilfrid Sellars: morality is based off of
“we-intentions”; something immoral is something that a community of people
agree, unspoken, to not do. Those who
break the silent pact are cast out.
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A liberal society is one whose ideals can be
fulfilled by persuasion rather than by force, by reform rather than
evolution, by the free and open encounters of present linguistic and other
practices with suggestions for new
practices.
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● Telic:
Directed or tending to a definite end
● Incommensurability:
impossible to measure or
compare in value or size or excellence.
● Platitudes:
A remark or statement, esp. one with a moral content, that has
been used too often to be interesting or thoughtful.
● Behoove:
It is a duty or responsibility for someone to do something; it
is incumbent on
● Adjudicate:Make
a formal judgment or decision about a problem or disputed matter
● Hylomorphism:
The doctrine that physical objects result from the combination
of matter and form
● Corpuscularianism:
a physical theory that supposed all matter to be composed of minute
particles, which became important in the Seventeenth century
● Desideratum:
Something that is needed or wanted
● Abjuration:
retraction: a disavowal or taking back of a previous assertion
● Palatable:
(of an action or proposal) Acceptable or satisfactory
● Animistic:(animism)
the doctrine that all natural objects and the universe itself have souls;
● Invidiously:
in a manner arousing resentment
● Pedagogical:(pedagogy)
teaching method: the principles and methods of instruction
● Vicissitudes:
A change of circumstances or fortune, typically one that is
unwelcome or unpleasant
● Consecration:
a solemn commitment of your life or your time to some cherished
purpose (to a service or a goal)
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Summary
Rorty starts
off this chapter by quickly recapping his ideas in the previous chapters, where
he draws distinctions between morals and expedience, absolutism and
relativism. He relates that his method
of arguing a point will be to use language that shows that the language his
critic is using is subpar, and therefore force his opponent to drop the subject
rather than to confront the issue head on.
He states that in this chapter he will try to do away with the notion of
Enlightenment rationalism, and therefore the idea of “philosophical foundations”.
Rorty
continues by citing Isaiah Berlin, and drawing parallels between their two
works. Rorty calls into question the
validity of “freedom” and holding onto one’s convictions. He says that to say everyone’s convictions
are only relative, is to say that no one can hold any absolute conviction,
ever. However, when considering
universal convictions, “[those] which can be justified to anyone is of
little interest”.
What follows
is an elaboration of irrationality and how “irrational” is a subjective term. To illustrate his point, he cites his own
example of transitioning vocabularies, where those who support the new
vocabulary face off against those who wish to stick with the old, and both
sides view the other as irrational.
Rorty cites Davidson’s interpretation of irrationality, who says that
irrationality may be a form of self criticism, and may be the very essence of
rational and freedom. According to
Davidson, there are times when people feel a desires that they do not agree
with. When our own desires do not sit
well with us, we try to examine why we desire that, and thus try to change our
desires to something we are more comfortable with. We try to change our “irrational” desires
into something more “rational”.
As he
continues in his discourse, Rorty discusses the productivity of trying to find
common ground in philosophical debates.
He says that he believes there is no standoff to be achieved, ever, in
any philosophical debate, as there are infinitely many different angles to
approach a certain problem.
The last
point that Rorty expands on is his own idea of a liberal utopia. He envisions a society that would be made up
of liberal ironists, people who have a sense of social awareness of language,
and the role it plays in society. He
believes that Western civilization has already went through the last conceptual
revolution that is needed, and he believes in maximizing the quality of
education, freedom of the press, educational opportunity, and other
opportunities to exert political influence, and other such things in order to
decrease the extent and amount of cruelty in society.
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